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Corruption in the Eyes of the World Bank:
Implications for the Institution's Policies
and Developing Countries
Carolina Pancotto Bohrer Munhoz*
I.

Introduction

For many years, the phenomenon of corruption has sparked the
interest of not only national governments and academia, but also
international society. In accordance with the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, this interest can be explained
by a combination of three factors: the large number of occurrences of
corrupt practices, the increase in detection of corrupt practices, and the
decrease in tolerating them.'
The central concern in the study of corruption is to identify its
sources and consequences in order to be able to combat it. Outstanding,
among other causes, is the existence of weak institutions, impunity, an
excess of regulation and taxes, and a lack of control and transparency in
public administration.2 In other words, fighting corruption is linked not
only to the removal of obstacles to economic growth, but also to the
promotion of development in the broadest sense of the term, including
also, the importance of institutions.3
*
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1. See United Nations, United Nations Actions Against Corruption And Bribery
(1997), available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/corrupt.htm (last visited Jan. 3,
2008) [hereinafter United Nations].
2. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Good Governance (UNDP 1997),
available at http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/ACPub-corruption-goodgov.pdf
(last visited Jan. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Rose-Ackman].
3. For greater discussion on the concept of development and institutions, see
CAROLINA P. BOHRER MUNHOZ, A Evolu¢do Hist6rica do Conceito de Desenvolvimento,
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A result of the interest and the importance attributed to the topic of
corruption was the elaboration or reforming of laws by many states
aiming to combat the phenomenon, and of multilateral, universal, and
regional treaties.
In addition, corruption entered the agenda of4
such as the United Nations ("N"),
organizations,
international
Organization of American States ("OAS"), 5 Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), 6 and the World Bank
("WB").7 However, this interest does not translate into a consensus on a
single definition of corruption, or the phenomena that comprises
corruption.
In fact, there is no universally accepted concept to apply, such as
measuring the level of corruption. Because of this, practices understood
or interpreted as being corrupt by one jurisdiction might not be
considered corrupt by a different jurisdiction. Also, elements such as
culture, historical events and specific circumstances affect the perception
people have about corruption. In other words, its8 significance can vary
according to social, cultural and historical context.
(M6nica
Teresa Costa Souza Cherem & Roberto di Sena Jr. eds., S~o Paulo, Brasil, Saraiva 2004).
Susan Rose-Ackerman emphasizes that corruption is, in the majority of hypotheses, a
second best response to the weakness of a government, and a highly-distorted method of
public choice. A state with endemic corruption could be greatly brutal to the poorest,
who do not have resources to compete with those who are able to pay bribes. See RoseAckerman, supranote 2, at vii.
4. See, e.g., United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, Anti-Corruption Tool Kit,
avaliable at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/corruptiontoolkit.html (last visited Jan. 1,
2008).
5. See, e.g., Interamerican Convention Against Corruption, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/fightcur.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2008) (In 1996, the
OAS member states adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. The
Convention, which was the first international legal instrument to address this issue,
specifically includes in its rationale the recognition of the international importance of
corruption and the need for an instrument to promote and facilitate inter-country
cooperation to combat it). OAS, Office of Legal Cooperation, the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, Background, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/corrbg.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
6. See, e.g., Organization For Economic Cooperaton and Development, Fighting
Corruption, available at http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37447 1_1 1 1
37447,00.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2008) (Corruption has become an issue of major
political and economic significance in recent years and the necessity to take measures
against it has become evident. The OECD has assumed a leading role in preventing
international bribery and corruption.).
7. World Bank, Anti-Corruption,
available at http://go.worldbank.org/
QYRWVXVH40 (last visited Jan. 1, 2008) (The World Bank has identified corruption as
among the greatest obstacles to economic and social development. It undermines
development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on
which economic growth depends.) [hereinafter World Bank.
8. LARISSA 0. RAMINA, AQAo INTERNACIONAL CONTRA A CoRRUPCAo 26 (Curitiba,
Brasil, Jurud 2003).
COMtRCIO INTERNACIONAL E DESENVOLVIMENTO: UMA PERSPECTIVA BRASILEIRA
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In this context, the objective of this Article is to identify the notion
of corruption adopted by the WB in an attempt to demonstrate in what
way this notion affects the actions of the institution in its fight against
corruption and in the promotion of its primary objectives. In order to
reach this objective, the adopted concept of corruption is analyzed in
different contexts, both national and international. Next, the Article
discusses the concept of corruption adopted by the WB, and the
implication of this for the actions of the institution. The Article then
analyzes the relationship that the preponderant role of the fight against
corruption as an instrument of promoting development has with the
paradigm of development adopted by the WB today, known as the
Comprehensive Development Framework. Some final considerations
will be added to conclude the Article.
II.

The Concept of Corruption

The Brazilian
There are many ways to define corruption.
Dictionary of Corruption, for example, states the following:
CORRUPTION: The term designated for the phenomenon in which
a public servant is brought to act in a way outside of the normative
patterns of the system, favoring private interests in exchange for
compensation. Corrupt is, therefore,9 the illegal behavior of one who
performs a role in the state structure.
Ramina cites the following idea of corruption: "1. To become morally
corrupt.... 2. Perversion or destruction of integrity in the performance
of public servants by bribe or favor; the use or existence of corrupt
practices in a state, state-owned company, etc." 1 ° Another definition
cites corruption as "licentiousness, depravity, in their many modes;
passive
improbity in the treatment of public property, in an active 1or
2
manner."' Or, still, "the use of public office for private gain."
Jesus reminds us that to the contrary of other legislation in Brazil,
the terms "corruption" and "bribe" are attributed the same meaning. 13 In
some countries the term "corruption" is used to describe the act
9. DICIONARio BRASILEIRO DE POLiTICA VERBETE: CoRRuPcAo, available at
http://www.politicavoz.com.br/corrupcaoepolitica/dicionario/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
10. The Oxford English Dictionary, in RAMINA, supra note 8, at 27.
11. ACADEMIA BRAS1LEIRA DE LETRAS JURiDICAS, DICIONARIO JURIDICO 205 (Sao
Paulo, Brasil, Forense 1994).
12. UNODC, Corrupqdo: custos econ6micos e propostas de combate, availableat
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/brazil/RelatF3rio corrup%E7%E3o%20e%20crescimento fi
nal resumo.doc (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
13. See Damdsio E. de Jesus, Breves Notas sobre o crime de corrupqdo ativa nas
transaq3es comerciais transnacionais(Nov. 2002), available at http://jus2.uol.com.br/
doutrina/texto.asp?id=3582 (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
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committed by a public servant. However, Brazil uses the word
"corruption" in different contexts to differentiate a public from private
act. Article 317 of the Brazilian Penal Code defines "corruption" as
passive corruption, a premeditated crime. Article 33 uses the term
"bribe" to describe active corruption, a premeditated act committed by a
private person. 14
Despite their differences, all of these definitions note a deviation
from an office's tasks or public good, used to benefit individuals, and not
just the collective. It is necessary to emphasize that corruption involves
not only the public servant and public good, but can also exist in the
private sector.
A.

The Concept of Corruptionin the InternationalArena

In the international arena there are also various attempts at defining
corruption. In the United Nations, the Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice Division recognizes that corruption is a complex phenomenon,
but that it is conceptually accustomed to accept the notion that the central
idea of corruption consists in some form as an abuse of power. The
generic concept noted is that corruption
is the "abuse of public office for
15
personal gain, directly or indirectly.,
Beyond the UN Convention against Corruption, two other important
international treaties recognize the theme: the Interamerican Convention
against Corruption, negotiated within the OAS; and the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions. These conventions have the same
goal of investing in the creation of preventive and punitive mechanisms
of corrupt acts, emphasizing the importance of cooperation among states
in this fight given the global character of the problem. However, neither
treaty manages to achieve the necessary consensus to create a definition
of corruption itself. They work with a practical approach, listing various

14. Brazilian Penal Code. It is necessary to emphasize that corruption is not
necessarily synonymous with illegal activity. Reos, for example, notes that there are
practices and activities that do not imply the violation of any legal provision, but which
show a fault in ethical and collective behavior. The way in which behaviors have effects
on the economy and society is part of what is generally called corruption. See Orlando A.
Reos, Efectos econ6micos de la corrupci6n 2-3 (2003), available at
http://www.iigov.org/eg/attachment.drt?art-103664 (last visited Jan. 3, 2008) (Criticizing
the emphasis on the illegality of the act in order to identify a corrupt practice, Kaufmann
suggests the following definition: "the privatization of public policy." In accordance
with this more neutral definition, an act must not necessarily be illegal to be understood
as corrupt in this broader sense of the word.). See Daniel Kaufmann, Myths and Realities
of Governance and Corruption 82 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/
govemance/pdf/2- lGCRKaufmann.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
15. See United Nations, supra note 1.
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practices considered to be corrupt, instead of defining them.' 6
The Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption of the Council of
Europe established the following provisional definition to guide the
group's discussions on corruption:
It is the bribery and any other behaviour in relation to persons
entrusted with responsibilities in the public or private sector which
violates their duties that follow from their status as public official,
private employee, independent agent or other relationship of that kind
and is aimed at obtaining
undue advantages of any kind for
17
themselves or for others.
The International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), for example, provides a
broader definition of corruption, an "abuse of power or confidence for
private benefit," which includes the idea that corruption can occur as
much in the public sphere as in the private. 8 This is an interesting
evolution in the treatment of the theme because it broadens corrupt
action to include the private sector. However, within the international
sphere, there is not a single definition detailing of what corruption
consists.
This allows for different approaches to the question in such a way
that each institution or international treaty considers corruption and its
consequences from distinct lenses. In this way, an institution like the
IMF, which works with a broader notion of corruption, including both
the private and public sectors in its definition of corruption, may act in a
distinct way from an institution or treaty that holds a different, more
restricted vision.
The objective of the following section is to identify exactly what
corruption is in the eyes of the WB and what the implications of this
vision are.
III. Corruption in the Eyes of the World Bank
The World Bank was created by fourty-four countries on June 1,
1944, at the Conference of Bretton Woods following the Second World
War. The objective was to reconstruct Europe, destroyed by the conflict,
by trying to control the economic chaos that was threatening the
developing world, while at the same time trying to alleviate human
16.

See United Nations, Escritrrio das Naqaes Unidas contra Drogas e o Crime,

available at http://www.undoc.org/brazil/programasglobais-corrupcao.html
Jan. 1, 2008).
17. See United Nations, supra note 1.

(last visited

18. International Monetary Fund, Improving Governance and Fighting Corruption:
an IMF perspective, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/imf2000.htm (last
visited Jan. 1, 2008).
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suffering by promoting actions focused on international development. 19
The WB was controversial from the moment it began due to its own
nature: it is simultaneously an organ of international cooperation for
development, and before anything else, a bank. It is true that it is not an
ordinary bank: besides not having account holders, it earns its capital
from contributions by the founding states. This capital is then used to
raise more funds through investing on Wall Street.2 °
The WB began its activities in 1946, with only 38 member-states.21
Over time its structure grew to be more complex bringing about what is
today known as the WB Group, consisting of 184 Member-States and
comprised of five organizations:
i) the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"); ii) the International
Development Association ("IDA"), iii) the International Finance
Corporation ("IFC"); iv) the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
("MIGA"); and v) the International
Centre for the Settlement of
22
Investment Disputes ("ICSID").
All of these organizations work together to reach the objectives
established in Bretton Woods. Within the WB structure, the IBRD and
the IDA play different, but complementary roles in an effort to achieve
the established objective of reducing poverty and improving quality of
life in the world. The IBRD concentrates on developing countries of
middle income and with credit, while the IDA concentrates on the
poorest countries of the world, without access to international flows of
private capital. IDA provides low interest loans; the IBRD provides no
interest loans. Additionally, the IDA provides funding to developing
countries enabling them to invest in education, health, infrastructure,

19. See SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE WORLD'S BANKER: A STORY OF FAILED STATES,
FINANCIAL CRISES, AND THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS 15-16 (New York, The
Penguin Press 2004).
20. Id. at 20-21.
21. World Bank, Working for a World Free of Poverty 3 (2005), available at
http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2008) [hereinafter World Bank, Working].
22. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") was
established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States (the Convention) which came into force on October
14, 1966.... ICSID is an autonomous international organization. However, it has close
links with the World Bank. All of ICSID's members are also members of the Bank."
World Bank Group, About ICSID, International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
Thus, to avoid confusion, it is necessary to emphasize that the reference to the World
Bank (this was shortened in the text, but the text and footnotes are independent of each
other) refers to the structure formed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the International Development Agency. When one wants to refer to the
World Bank Group or the institutions that are a part of it, this will be done in the manner
expressed. For an analysis and self-description of the functions of each of the institutions
that compose the World Bank Group. See id.
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communication and the like.23
The WB functions as a cooperative in which its 184 Member States
act as shareholders. These shareholders are represented by a Board of
Governors, who effectively decides which policies are adopted by the
institution.24 This council of directors is led by a president, traditionally
from the United States, being the greatest shareholder nation. As of July
2007, the WB has been directed by Robert B. Zoellick, the eleventh
president to assume the position.2 5 The mandate of presidency is for five
years, renewable for the same period.2 6
There are two basic types of loans offered by the WB. These are
loans for investing in goods, services and works to support economic and
social development projects, and adjustment loans to support political
and institutional reforms. During the negotiation of loans, the WB and
the country requesting a loan agree on the area of development which the
the project or program will focus, the expected results, the indicators of
performance, and a plan to realize the program idea. Once the loan is
approved, the country taking the27loan puts the project into practice in
accordance with the agreed terms.
Since its creation more than sixty years ago, the WB has
experienced many transformations, influenced by factors such as the
international economic environment. Economic changes create different
needs for the client of the institution. Additionally, through the notion of
development adopted in different periods of its history the institution has
already passed through phases in which its mission was poverty
reduction, supporting projects that involved anything from agriculture to
health and education, then reaching the phase of structural adjustment,
and today discussing the model of comprehensive development and the
23. World Bank, Working, supra note 21, at 6-7.
24. In accordance with the weighted voting principle applied in the Bretton Woods
Institutions, voting shares were aligned with contributions to World Bank capital. See
Aziz Ali Mohammed, Who pays for the World Bank?, Working Paper for the
Intergovemamental Group of Twenty Four 5, at 3 (May 2004), available at
http://www.g24.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2008). It is necessary to note that the structure of
governance of the Bretton Woods Institutions is the basis for one of the principle
critiques made about the World Bank and the International Montetary Fund. According
to Buira, at the root of this crisis lies the unrepresentative nature of their structure of
governance, which places control of the institutions in the hands of a small group of
industrial and undeveloped countries. See Ariel Buira, The Bretton Woods Institutions:
governance without legitimacy?, CSGR Working Paper No. 180/05 2 (2005), available at
http://www.g24.org/govwtlg.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
25. See Larry Catd Backer, On the Selection of the President of the World Bank: A
Reverie on Law, Democracy and Power, Law at the End of the Day (June 7, 2007),
available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/06/on-selection-of-president-ofworld-bank.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
26. World Bank, Working, supra note 21, at 10.
27. Id. at 21.
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role of institutions in the process of development.
A.

Combating Corruption

One of the transformations that occurred during the WB's existence
was the inclusion of the theme of corruption on its agenda, even as early
as the 1990s. 28 This inclusion resulted from the observation that corrupt
practices affect the economic performance of states, which would justify
the inclusion of corruption criteria in the analysis for granting loans at
the WB.29 Such an observation is fundamental as its establishing
agreement states that it should only take into consideration questions of
economics and of efficiency when making decisions. In other words, not
only political questions can be considered. It is important to emphasize
that there has been a tendency to include themes related to political and
social factors on the agenda of the institution-such as governance,
protection of human rights, and fighting corruption-but which generate
relevant effects over economic decisions.3 °
It is necessary to add that, in accordance with the WB itself, the
focus on governance and fighting corruption is based on the mission to
reduce poverty, as a capable state creates opportunities for poor people,
distributing better services and creating higher levels of development.
And outside of its mandate to promote development to reduce poverty,
the WB has another obligation set forth in its Establishing Agreement, to
assure that its resources are used in accordance with established
objectives. In other words, the provision means to prevent World Bank's
resources being used for other ends.31
Fighting corruption has been on the WB agenda consistently and the
28. An approach to governance and combating corruption has been on the World
Bank agenda since 1996, when ex-president James D. Wolfenshon gave a speech titled,
"The Cancer of Corruption." For a discussion and description of historical developments
on this front, see World Bank, Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on
Governance and Anticorruption (2007), available at http://www.worldbank.org (last

visited Jan. 1, 2008).
29.

See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Role of the World Bank in Controlling

Corruption 18 (1997), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3791/
is_199710/ai n8762739/pg18 (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
30. See Roberto Dafiino, The Legal Aspects of the World Bank's Work on Human
Rights, 41 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 21, 22-23 (2007). It is necessary to note that

there are questions regarding whether controlling corruption is a concern of the
international community. Many consider corruption an internal problem and that foreign
intervention would represent an attempt to impose occidental values. Others, still
recognizing the costs of corrupt governments, argue that controlling corruption does not
need to be linked to international business and the policies of granting loans, including
the questioning of the involvement of loan-granting organizations and international
assistance organizations. They argue that commercial policy and development assistance
should not be tied to non-economic issues. See Rose-Ackerman, supranote 2, at 90.
31. See World Bank, supra note 21, at 9-10.
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WB has developed various reports and other research on the topic. ExPresident Paul Wolfowitz brought the institution to place a greater
emphasis on combating corruption as a fundamental element in
promoting development.32
In September of 1997, the World Bank Executive Advisory Board
approved its first anti-corruption strategy of the institution. This strategy
defined corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain, and
brought the WB to act against corruption in four areas: i) preventing
fraud and corruption in WB projects of the institution; ii) helping
countries that ask for assistance in combating corruption; iii) making
corruption a central focus of the WB's concern in the work of the WB;
iv) and giving support to international forces combating corruption.33
During this period there was also a broad consensus at the heart of
the WB around the idea that corruption is synonymous with bad
governance, and that, therefore, combating corruption required giving
attention to the causes of bad governance. 34 However, bad governance
and corruption are not synonymous.
Governance refers to the form in which public servants and
institutions acquire and exercise authority in order to give form to public
policy and distribute goods and public services. 5 Daniel Kaufmann
defines governance as the combination of traditions and institutions over
which authority is exercised in a country for the common good. This
includes: i) the process by which those in authority are selected,
monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); ii) the government's
capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound
policies (the economic dimension); and iii) the respect of citizens and the
state for the country's institutions (the institutional respect dimension).3 6
For Kaufmann, corruption is a result of bad governance, involving the
aforementioned abuse of power for private gains.37 In other words, the
topic of governance is much broader than that of corruption, but in this
vision, both are a part of the same framework.
Given the WB's adoption of this nexus theory between competence
32. This observation can be made from an analysis of speeches given by Wolfowitz
during his term. See JEFFREY SACHS, 0 FIM DA POBREZA: COMO ACABAR COM A MIStRIA
MUNDIAL NOS PROXIMOS 20 ANOS (So Paulo, Brasil: Companhia das Letras, 2005)
(making this observation from an analysis of speeches given by Wolfowitz during his
term).
33. Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, Anti-corruption Policies and Programs: a
framework for evaluation, 1 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org (last visited
Jan. 1, 2008). For a view of the current strategy of governance and combating corruption
at the World Bank, see World Bank, supra note 7.
34. Huther and Shah, supra note 33.
35. World Bank, supra note 7, at 9.
36. Daniel Kaufmann, supra note 14.
37. World Bank, supra note 7, at 9.
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of governance and corruption, successful programs in combating
corruption, according to Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, are seen as those
that turn to the underlying flaws of governance, and which result in
fewer possibilities for gains and greater probability of punishment. Such
programs must be focused on the quality of governance of the country.
Huther and Shah note that previous experiences of developed countries
confirm these conclusions, since such countries did not achieve a
reduction of corruption by introducing technocratic solutions, but by
encouraging a 38sense of duty among public servants through the idea of
accountability.

Accountability is the other fundamental concept in the WB's
approach to corruption. Accountability represents more than mere
responsibility. It expresses the idea that people are sensitive to the
results of their actions when those results are attributable to their actions;
with delegated authority and is distinct from
it is associated
39
responsibility.
and
corruption,
concepts-governance,
of these
All
accountability-are linked. If a country enjoys good governance, this
indicates that resources are allocated efficiently and in response to the
essential needs of the society. Democratic and efficient forms of
governance are based on public participation, transparency, and
accountability, including the spectrum of approaches and practices used
by governments to guarantee that their activities and results adhere to
established objectives and standards. Corruption compromises the
integrity of governments, affecting the credibility of democratic
institutions, which are essential for good governance.4n
Despite the fact that the definition of corruption adopted by the WB
does not differ greatly from other analytic definitions-in fact, it is quite
a traditional definition-the form in which it is treated confers upon it
specific characteristics within the WB. The WB's conception of an
established link between corruption and a lack of good governance and
accountability has resulted in a redefinition of what it means to combat
corruption, from a limited strategy focused on simply eradicating corrupt
practices, such as bribery or nepotism, to the inclusion of facts that
permit these practices to arise. In other words, when there is good
governance and accountability, levels of corruption are lower. On the
other hand, when governance is of poor quality and there is a lack of
accountability, levels of corruption tend to be higher.4'
38. See Huther & Shah, supra note 33, at 12.
39. Accountability, available at www.ucsc.edu/matman/bppwg/glossary.hm (last
visited Jan. 1, 2008).
40.
41.

See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at v.
For a more detailed discussion relating to governance, accountability and
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Thus, for the WB to combat corruption, the promotion of good
governance and high levels of accountability are necessary. It is not
possible to combat corruption effectively without also combating
problems of bad governance or reduced levels of accountability. Thus,
the strategy of the WB to combat corruption is intimately linked to the
issues of governance and accountability.42
IV. The Relationship Between Corruption and the Comprehensive
Development Framework of the World Bank
At different times since its creation, the WB has been influenced by
at least four different visions of development. Initially influenced by the
work of Rostow, the WB and its economists saw the accumulation of
fixed capital as the key to development later, the work of Theodore
Schultz and Gary Becker on the importance of human capital to
successful development came to influence the vision adopted by the
institution. At the end of the 1970s, facing international economic
conjecture (influenced, in great part, by oil shocks),43 the WB adopted
the notion that would come to be known as "structural adjustment." At
least from the time of James Wolfensohn's presidency, 44 the institution
the idea of a "comprehensive development
has implemented
45
framework.,
Support for the idea that the accumulation of fixed capital was
central to successful development caused the institution to support an
increase of investment in fixed capital such as roads, canals, highways,
factories, and machinery. All WB projects approved during this period
reflected this idea.46
At the beginning of the 1960s, the worldwide vision of development
began to change, and this was reflected within the WB. Now the idea of
the primary importance of human capital to the process of development,
corruption, see id.; World Bank, supra note 7; Huther & Shah, supra note 33.
42. Thus, an analysis of the current strategy of the World Bank is interesting. The
strategy was approved by the institution in March of 2007, and the reports about the
global indicators of governance are available on the institution's website. This Article
does not evaluate the adequacy of the approach of the World Bank in combating
corruption. Rather, the objective here is to portray the approach; the assessment of this
approach is done in Carolina P. Bohrer Munhoz, 0 Conceito de Desenvolvimento no
dmbito do Bando Mundial, manuscript prepared for Universidade Federal de Santa
Caterina Facultad de Direito (2007).
43.

See,

e.g.,

Gary

Becker,

Human

Capital

(1975),

available

at

http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/humancapital.html (last visited November 29, 2007).
44.

See James D. Wolfensohn, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development

Draft
Discussion
World
Bank
Framework,
http://www.mohsenfardi.com (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
45. See MALLABY, supra note 19.
46. Id. at 22.

(1999),

available

at
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in preference to fixed capital, gained ascendance at the WB. Investment
projects expanded beyond the simple goal of acquiring fixed capital, now
encompassing areas such as education and professional training. During
this period, WB President Robert McNamara played a key role in
expanding the role of the institution. 47
By the end of the 1970's, the external economic environment
caused the WB to change its position once again. Two world oil shocks,
combined with the internal economic environment of many developing
countries-which included serious problems of balance of payments,
high inflation, slow growth and high unemployment were the main
causes of this change. The WB's response to this new reality was an
emphasis on structural adjustment as an instrument well suited to lead
countries safely along the path of development. Later known as the
Washington Consensus, this new approach consisted of a process of
reform oriented toward markets and institutions, with the objective of
restoring a sustainable balance of payments, reducing inflation, and
creating conditions to facilitate a sustainable increase in per capita
income. 48
This brought about the beginning of a new era for the WB, during
which a phase with a broad agenda covering a series of themes, such as
population control and agriculture alternated with a more restricted
agenda focused on policies of change, balanced budgets and other
macroeconomic challenges. Such a focus excluded other analytical
perspectives on the question of development, whether social,
environmental or political, and brought unending criticism of the WB
and its performance in the following years. 4 9 Furthermore, the reforms
did not have their predicted and desired results. Instead, heavy social
costs resulted from the required reforms tied to the granting of loans.
This only contributed to the discontent of various sectors of civil society
in the developing countries receiving aid.5 °
During the 1990s, when Wolfensohn assumed the presidency of the
WB, various changes began to take place in its structure and role. At the
same time, studies and discussions on the theme of development
47.
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50. Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? 2
(Harv. Univ. 2006), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-drodrik/Lessons%20oP/o

20the%201990s%20review%20_JEL_.pdf(last visited Jan. 1,2008).

2008]

CORRUPTION IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD BANK

continued. New ideas and concepts continued to arise in an effort to
quantify and define the term.
Eventually, the observable failure of the structural adjustment
approach and new thinking on the concept of development resulted in the
adoption of a new theory by the
WB called the "comprehensive
51
development framework" ("CDF").
The CDF encompasses a series of principles that must guide
development and poverty reduction. According to the WB itself, the
central objectives are the elimination of poverty, the reduction of
inequality, and the augmentation of opportunities for people in
developing countries and least developed countries. The CDF would
permit countries to reach the objectives mentioned above by emphasizing
the interdependence of all the elements involved in the process: social,
structural,
human, environmental,
economic,
financial,
and
governmental.5 2
The principles that guide development and the reduction of poverty
under the CDF are: a holistic vision, with long-term thinking, of the
development process; the idea that each country "possesses" and directs
its own process of development; the realization of stronger partnerships
among governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other
actors in the development process to permit the implementation of the
country strategy; and a transparent focus on the results obtained from the
process of development, which would guarantee greater efficacy in the
actions aimed toward poverty reduction.5 3
The idea, according to Blake, is to look for a better equilibrium in
the creation of policies by highlighting the interdependence of all of the
elements of development.
This approach places emphasis on
partnerships between governments, donors, civil society, the private
sector and other actors in the process of development. For Blake, the
most important point is to place developing countries in a leadership
position, taking ownership of the project and directing the development
agenda with the WB and other partners.54
At the heart of the CDF is a matrix that shows the interaction
between the structural, social and human elements of development and
51. Richard Cameron Blake, The World's Bank Draft Comprehensive Development
Framework and the Micro-Paradigmof Law and Development, 3 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J.
159
(2000),
available at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/html/archive/vol3/
vol3.4abstract.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
52. World Bank, Working, supranote 21, at 3; James D. Wolfensohn, supra note 44.
53. World
Bank,
Governance Matters
V
(2006),
available at
http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2008); World Bank, Working for a World
Free of Poverty (2005), availableat http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2008);
Wolfensohn, supranote 44.
54. See Blake, supra note 51.
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the actors involved in this process. The vertical column is comprised of
four aspects of development: a) structural: good and clean government;
an effective legal and justice system; a well-organized and supervised
financial system; and a social safety net and social programs; b) human:
education; health; and population issues; c) physical:
water and
sewerage; energy; roads, transportation and telecommunications; and
sustainable development, environmental, and cultural preservation; and
d) sector strategies: rural; urban; private sector; and country-specific.55
To the left side are the actors involved in development:
a) governments: national; provincial and state; and city and municipal;
b) multilateral and bilateral organizations: such as the United Nations;
regional economic blocs such as the European Union; regional
development banks such as the African Development Bank; c) civil
society: such as religious groups; trade unions; local and international
non-governmental organizations; and groups of indigenous peoples; and
d) private sector: foreign and national business.56
Using the matrix, the actors in the process of development can
coordinate their efforts, using the following principles: a) individual
countries, rather than the WB, should take the lead and assume
ownership in setting their own development goals and strategies, as well
as the timing of those goals and strategies, and b) development should be
holistic, focusing on social problems, as well as economic ones. In terms
of social development, the WB emphasizes the varied categories of the
CDF matrix, stating that all categories must be taken into consideration;
c) all development actors should be involved in formulating and
implementing development policy. As national governments set their
development agenda, they should use the CDF matrix to include other
actors in the planning of programs and projects. One country's CDF
matrix will differ from another country's as each country uses the CDF
to address its unique needs. The model focuses on the process of
formulating development policies, as well as the identification and
coordination of the actors who will implement them; and lastly,
d) development should be a "participatory process" with development
policies taking a long-term focus; as far as possible, development should
be based on broad national consultation and consensus.57
With the CDF, Blake emphasizes, countries themselves supervise or
plan their development, instead of having this planning imposed, as was
the case in the era of structural adjustment. The Washington Consensus
was a prescription given to all of the developing countries, without
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taking into account specific problems of each country. The CDF also
represented a great change in the policy of the WB in the sense that it
would cooperate with all of the actors of development; not only the
governments, but also civil society and the private sector. In the past, the
WB worked exclusively with government, often 58
ignoring or duplicating
efforts of other actors in the development process.
With this new perspective, the role of the WB once again shifted,
expanding to encompass new actions that went beyond the doctrinal
confines of structural adjustment.
These actions have involved
investment in health and education, fighting corruption, incentives for
agricultural production, the construction of roads and ports, the
protection of the environment and participation in the reconstruction of
countries and regions destroyed by war; distributing, for example, basic
services such as potable water, or encouraging investments in order to
generate new jobs. 59
This new form of viewing the process of development not only
alters the form in which the institution acts, but also, and principally,
changes the way in which it relates to the developing countries and least
developed countries. The impact of these actions on such countries
becomes more comprehensive as their own actions become more
comprehensive.
Without a doubt, the CDF represents an advance from the previous
and quite exclusive focus of the WB on large-scale projects; while such
major projects are still undertaken, they share space with other projects
inspired by CDF theory. Also implicit in this framework is the
recognition that development is a much broader concept than mere
economic development. 60
One criticism of the WB's CDF approach is that participation in the
receiving countries has not gone beyond the empowerment of
government officials, leaving private actors outside the process. For
some, corruption ought to be the focus of private sector rather than
public sector stakeholders .6 Blake, among others, offers a more specific
critique. He notes the existence of obstacles for a true appropriation and
participation in the implementation of these projects as owing to
circumstances in the receiving countries themselves. The principal
problem lies in how to guarantee true civilian participation at all levels of
the process, a fundamental element of the concept of development itself.
58. Id.
59. World Bank, Working, supra note 21, at 3.
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Other commentators, the author emphasizes, call attention to the
inherently descriptive nature of the CDF: upon suggesting to the
developing countries that the elements of the matrix of the CDF are
important aspects of development, and focusing only on these elements
in discussions with the WB, the framework seems less flexible and more
like an imposition by the institution.6 2
The implementation of projects under the CDF is still new and
future changes may be necessary. On this topic, Blake suggests that for
the CDF to effectively realize its potential as a vehicle for reducing
poverty, the WB must encourage, and expect total involvement of civil
society within the receiving countries in all such projects.6 3
Succeeding Wolfensohn to the presidency of the WB in 2005, Paul
Wolfowitz, brought a new perspective to the institution. This new
perspective led to a change in how the CDF was implemented. There
was now a focus on combating corruption as a fundamental tool in the
promotion of development. Combating corruption was preached not
only in words-as in the discourses and declarations of Wolfowitz
during his presidency-but also through actions.
Paul Wolfowitz resigned from the presidency of the WB in 2007,
and was replaced by Robert Zoellick. Wolfowitz resigned his position
after charges of nepotism were made against him. Given the dearth of
clear signals from Zoellick to this point in time regarding his views on
development, it remains to be seen what, if any, changes he will bring to
bear on the WB's implementation of the CDF.64 At present, information
offered by the WB continues to identify combating corruption and
promoting good governance as the principal focal points for successful
development.
Two critiques can be made about the emphasis on combating
corruption. The first and most obvious is that the focus on combating
corruption represents a deviation in the interpretation of the CDF. The
WB itself, when it speaks of the framework and its matrix, emphasizes
that it is necessary to adopt a holistic vision of development, one
consisting of many components. An honest government represents only
one of these components, and an excessive emphasis on it could lead to
forgetting the others.
Concentrating only on good governance and combating corruption
would lead back to the idea of a magic solution for the problem of
poverty: when a country promotes good governance, thereby controlling
the phenomenon of corruption, it will always develop. All of the lessons
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Catd Backer, supra note 25.
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learned during the more than fifty years of experience at the WB would
be once again abandoned. The only difference in relation to the previous
models would be the content of the aforementioned magic solution: no
more investment in infrastructure, human capital or rules imposed in the
model of structural adjustment, but the trust that a country free of the evil
of corruption is a country that will necessarily develop.
As Sachs emphasizes, although there exist reasons for supporting
better governance in poor countries, the focus on corruption and on bad
governance is excessive.65 In the case of Africa especially, Sachs
emphasizes that the economic backwardness of the continent cannot be
attributed only to corruption and bad governance, nor exclusively to
colonial violence and occidental meddling (though these factors share
blame). Despite the recognition that the pattern in practically the entire
African continent is that of low quality of governance, Sachs notes that
developed countries are accustomed to having indicators of governance
and corruption that are higher than those of poor countries. According to
Sachs, good governance and high income go hand in hand not only
because good governance increases income, but also because, and maybe
even more importantly, higher income brings about better governance.66
In this way, when the income of a country grows, the governance
normally improves because the conditions of the population as a whole
improve, rendering it able to assess political-economic processes, and to
invest in governance of higher quality. 67 And it is not only this.
Analyzing again the African case, Sachs emphasizes that whatever the
level of quality of governance may be, African countries tend to grow
less rapidly than countries located in other regions, even though they
have similar levels of governance. When speaking of Africa, Sachs says,
it is necessary to take into consideration other variables, such as
geographic and ecological questions, without which it would be
impossible to explain the low economic performance of African
countries. 68 In other words: corruption is a problem for the process of
development, but not the only problem; addressing corruption alone
cannot resolve the question of development.
Final Considerations

V.

The theme of corruption has been at the center of attention in
national as well as international arenas. In recent years, national
legislation to combat corruption has proliferated, as have international
65.
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treaties addressing the issue.
However, this interest does not translate into a consensus on a single
definition of corruption, or about the phenomena that it entails. In fact,
there is no universally accepted concept of corruption. Because of this,
practices understood or interpreted as being corrupt in one jurisdiction
might not be judged corrupt in another.
The form in which corruption is understood influences the methods
used to combat it. As discussed throughout this Article, the WB adopts a
quite traditional definition of corruption. On the other hand, this
definition is inserted in a broad context, in which notions of governance
and accountability play fundamental roles.
The central idea that imbues all of the WB's logic of combating
corruption is that corruption is inextricably linked to the quality of
governance: when there is good governance and accountability, levels of
corruption are lower; in the absence of these elements, levels of
corruption tend to be higher. In this way, the approach of the WB to
combat corruption includes the promotion of good governance and high
levels of accountability. In other words, from the point of view of the
Bank, it is not possible to combat corruption in an efficient manner
without approaching problems of bad governance and reduced levels of
accountability.
Though the WB's approach to combating corruption seems quite
broad, the way in which it involves factors that go beyond the good old
binomial of repression/punishment and the excessive emphasis on
corruption seems contrary to the CDF adopted by the institution itself. In
this way, betting on good governance corruption represents not only a
diversion from, and a restriction of, the application of the CDF, but also a
strategy that by itself is incapable of resolving the question of poverty in
the world.

